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1. Introduction 
Virtual Reality (VR) has been usually described as a collection of technological devices: a 
computer capable of interactive 3D visualization, a head-mounted display and data gloves 
equipped with one or more position trackers [1]. The trackers sense the position and 
orientation of the user and report that information to the computer which updates the 
images for display in real time. 
However, in the behavioral sciences, VR is usually described as [2] “an advanced form of 
human-computer interface that allows the user to interact with and become immersed in a 
computer-generated environment in a naturalistic fashion” (p. 82). 
This feature transforms VR in an “empowering environment”, a special, sheltered setting 
where patients can start to explore and act without feeling of being threatened [3]. Nothing the 
patients fear can “really” happen to them in VR. With such assurance, they can freely explore, 
experiment, and experience feelings and/or thoughts. VR thus becomes a very useful 
intermediate step between the therapist’s office and the real world [4; 5]. In other words, the 
key feature of VR for clinical goals is that it offers an effective support to the activity of the 
subject by activating the feeling of “presence”, the feeling of being inside the virtual world.  
But what is presence? In this chapter we will use the following three research outcomes 
emerging from the recent work of cognitive sciences to build a cognitive theory of presence:  
1. Cognitive processes can be either rational or intuitive: we will argue that presence is an 
intuitive feeling that is the outcome of an experience-based metacognitive judgment; 
2. Skills become intuitive when our brain is able to simulate their outcome: we will show argue 
that presence monitors intuitively our activity processes using embodied simulations; 
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3. Space is perceived in terms of the actions we could take towards them: we will argue that the 
feeling of Presence in a real or virtual space is directly correlated to the outcome of the 
actions the subject can enact in it; 
In sum, the feeling of presence can be described as the product of an intuitive experience-
based metacognitive judgment related to the enaction of our intentions: We are present in an 
environment - real and/or synthetic - when we are able, inside it, to intuitively transform our 
intentions in actions. The consequences of this claim for the development of clinical virtual 
environments are presented and discussed. 
2. Virtual reality: From technology to experience 
Since 1986, when Jaron Lamier used the term for the first time, VR has been usually 
described as a collection of technological devices. In general, a VR system is the combination 
of the hardware and software that enables developers to create VR applications [6]. The 
hardware components receive input from user-controlled devices and convey multi-sensory 
output to create the illusion of a virtual world. The software component of a VR system 
manages the hardware that makes up VR system. This software is not necessarily 
responsible for actually creating the virtual world. Instead, a separate piece of software (the 
VR application) creates the virtual world by making use of the VR software system. 
Typically, a VR system is composed by [6]: 
- the output tools (visual, aural and haptic), that immerse the user in the virtual 
environment; 
- the input tools (trackers, gloves  or mice) that continually reports the position and 
movements of the users; 
- the graphic rendering system that generates the virtual environment; 
- the database construction and virtual object modeling software for building and maintaining 
detailed and realistic models of the virtual world. In particular, the software handles the 
geometry, texture, intelligent behavior, and physical modeling of hardness, inertia, and 
surface plasticity of any object included in the virtual world. 
However, as we have seen in the introduction VR can be described, too, as an advanced 
form of human-computer interface. Specifically, what distinguishes VR from other media or 
communication systems is the sense of presence. VR can be considered the leading edge of a 
general evolution of present communication interfaces such as television, computer and 
telephone whose ultimate goal is the full immersion of the human sensorimotor channels 
into a vivid and interactive communication experience. But what is presence? 
The term “Presence” entered the general scientific debate in 1992 when Sheridan and Furness 
used it in the title of a new journal dedicated to the study of virtual reality systems and 
teleoperations: Presence, Teleoperators and Virtual Environments. In the first issue, Sheridan 
clearly refers to presence as an experience elicited by technology use [7]: the effect felt when 
controlling real world objects remotely as well as the effect people feel when they interact 
with and immerse themselves in virtual environments. 
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This vision describes presence as “Media Presence”, a function of our experience of a given 
medium [7-10]. The main outcome of this approach is the “perceptual illusion of non-
mediation” [10] definition of presence. Following it, presence is produced by means of the 
disappearance of the medium from the conscious attention of the subject. The main 
advantage of this approach is its predictive value: the level of presence is reduced by the 
experience of mediation during the action. The main limitation of this vision is what is not 
said. What is presence for? Is it a specific cognitive process? What is its role in our daily 
experience?  
To address these questions, a second group of researchers considers presence as “Inner 
Presence”, the feeling of being located in a perceived external world around the self [11-13]. 
In this view presence is broad psychological phenomenon, not necessarily linked to the 
experience of a medium, whose goal is the control of the individual and social activity. In 
the next paragraphs we will justify this statement using the recent work of cognitive 
sciences. 
3. The first feature of presence: it is an intuitive process 
A first problem related to the research about presence is its role in cognitive science: what is 
its foundation in terms of the cognitive processes involved in it? Stanovich & West, [14] 
noted that in the last forty years, different authors from different disciplines suggested a 
two-process theory of reasoning based on Intutive and Rational processes. Even if the 
details and specific features of these theories do not always match perfectly, nevertheless 
they share the following properties: 
 Intuitive operations are faster, automatic, effortless, associative, and difficult to control 
or modify.  
 Rational operations, instead, are slower, serial, effortful, and consciously controlled.  
One of the theories based on this distinction is the cognitive-experiential self-theory (CEST). 
As explained by Epstein [15]: 
“A fundamental assumption in CEST is that people operate by two cognitive systems: an 
“experiential system”, which is a nonverbal automatic learning system, and a “rational system,” 
which is a verbal reasoning system. The experiential system operates in a manner that is 
preconscious, automatic, nonverbal, imagistic, associative… and its schemas are primarily 
generalizations from emotionally significant intense or repetitive experience… In contrast to the 
automatic learning of the experiential system, the rational system is a reasoning system that operates 
in a manner that is conscious, verbal, abstract, analytical, affect free, effortful, and highly demanding 
of cognitive resources. It acquires its beliefs by conscious learning from books, lectures and other 
explicit sources of information, and from logical inference; and it has a very brief evolutionary 
history.” (pp. 24-25). 
The differences between the two systems are described in Table 1. An interesting feature of 
this approach is that intuition is not only innate. As demonstrated by the research on 
perceptual-cognitive and motor skills, these skills are automatized through experience and 
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thus rendered intuitive [16]. In the case of motor skill learning, the process is initially 
rational and controlled by consciousness, as shown, for example, by the novice driver's 
rehearsal of the steps involved in parking a car: check the mirrors and blind spots; signal to 
the side of the space; position the car beside the vehicle I’m parking behind, etc.  
 
 Experiential/Intuitive System Rational System
Main 
Features 
 Intuitive: Preconscious, 
automatic, and intimately 
associated with affect 
 Concrete: Encodes reality in 
images, metaphors, and 
narratives 
 Associative: Connections by 
similarity and contiguity 
 Rapid processing: Oriented 
toward immediate action 
 Resistant to change: Changes 
with repetitive or intense 
experience 
 Differentiated: Broad 
generalization gradient; 
categorical thinking 
 Integrated: Situationally 
specific; organized in part by 
cognitive-affective modules 
 Experienced passively and 
preconsciously: We are seized 
by our emotions 
 Self-evidently valid: 
“Experiencing is believing” 
 Rational: Conscious, deliberative and 
affect-free 
 Abstract: Encodes reality in symbols, 
words, and numbers 
 Analytic: Connections by cause-and-
effect relations 
 Slower processing: Capable of long 
delayed action 
 Less resistant to change: Can change 
with speed of thought 
 More highly differentiated: nuanced 
thinking 
 More highly integrated: Organized in 
part by cross-situational principles 
 Experienced actively and consciously: 
We believe we are in control of our 
thoughts 
 Not Self-evident: Requires 
justification via logic and evidence 
How it 
works 
 Operates by hedonic principle
(what feels good) 
 Acquires its schemas by 
learning from experience 
 Outcome oriented 
 Behavior mediated by “vibes” 
from past experience
 Operates by reality principle (what is 
logical and supported by evidence) 
 Acquires its beliefs by conscious 
learning and logical inference 
 More process oriented 
 Behavior mediated by conscious 
appraisal of events
Table 1. Differences between the Intuitive and Rational system according to the cognitive-experiential 
self-theory 
However, later the skill becomes intuitive and consciously inaccessible by virtue of practice, 
as shown, for example, by the difficulty of expert drivers to describe how to perform a 
complex maneuver to others, and by the fact that conscious attention to it actually interferes 
with their driving performance. 
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In sum, perceptual-motor skills that are not innate – e.g. driving a car - may become 
automatic through practice, and their operations thereby rendered intuitive. Using a 
metaphor derived from computer science, this process can be described as “knowledge 
compilation” [16]: a knowledge given in a general representation format (linguistic-semantic) 
is translated into a different one, more usable and less computationally demanding 
(perceptual-motor). 
Are presence and telepresence intuitive or rational cognitive processes? On one side, it is 
evident that presence is the outcome of an intuitive cognitive process: no rational effort is 
required to experience a feeling of presence. On the other side, however, presence is different 
from an acquired motor skill or a behavioral disposition. 
A possible path to find a better answer comes from the concept of metacognition. Koriat [17] 
defines “metacognition” as “the processes by which people self-reflect on their own 
cognitive and memory processes (monitoring) and how they put their metaknowledge to 
use in regulating their information processing and behavior (control).” (p. 289). Following 
the distinction between Intuition and Reasoning, researchers in this area distinguish 
between information-based (or theory-based) and experience-based metacognitive judgments 
[17].  
Information-based metacognitive judgments are based on a deliberate use of one’s beliefs 
and theories to reach an evaluation about one’s competence and cognitions: they are 
deliberate and largely conscious, and draw on the contents of declarative information in 
long term memory. By contrast, experience-based metacognitive judgments are subjective 
feelings that are product of an inferential intuitive process: they operate unconsciously and 
give rise to a “sheer subjective experience”. An example of these metacognitive judgment 
are [18]: the “feeling of knowing” (knowing that we are able to recognize the correct answer to 
a question that we cannot currently recall), or the “feeling of familiarity” (knowing that we 
have encountered a given situation before, even if we don’t have an explicit memory of it). 
In conclusion, we may describe presence as the sheer subjective experience of being in a 
given environment (the feeling of “being there”) that is the product of an intuitive 
experience-based metacognitive judgment. 
4. The second feature of presence: it is the outcome of a simulation 
A second critical question is “What is intuitively judged by Presence?”. Different authors 
have suggested a role of presence in the monitoring of action. For example, Zahoric and 
Jenison [19] underlined that ‘‘presence is tantamount to successfully supported action in the 
environment’’ (p. 87); Riva and colleagues [13]: suggested that “…the evolutionary role of 
presence is the control of agency” (p. 24); finally, Slater and colleagues [20] argued that 
“humans have a propensity to find correlations between their activity and internal state and 
their sense perceptions of what is going on out there” (p. 208). But, how may this work? And 
how this process is related to intuition? As suggested by Reber [21]:  
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“To have an intuitive sense of what is right and proper, to have a vague feeling of the goal of an 
extended process of thought, to “get the point” without really being able to verbalize what it is that 
one has gotten, is to have gone through an implicit learning experience and have built up the requisite 
representative knowledge base to allow for such judgment.” (p. 233).  
In simpler words, through implicit learning the subject is able to represent complex actions 
using perceptual-motor data and enact/monitor them intuitively. An empirical proof of this 
hypothesis is the recent discovery of neuronal resonance processes activated by the simple 
observation of others. Rizzolatti and colleagues found that a functional cluster of premotor 
neurons (F5c-PF) contains “mirror neurons”, a class of neurons that are activated both during 
the execution of purposeful, goal-related hand actions, and during the observation of similar 
actions performed by another individual [22]. 
The general framework outlined by the discovery of neuronal resonance processes was used 
by Simulation Theorists − for example, Lawrence Barsalou, Vittorio Gallese, Alvin Goldman, 
Jane Heal, Susan Hurley, Marc Jeannerod, Guenter Knoblich and Margaret Wilson − to 
support the following view: the mirror system instantiates simulation of transitive actions 
used to map the goals and purposes of others’ actions [23; 24]. As clearly explained by 
Wilson and Knoblich [25] this is the outcome of an implicit/covert, subpersonal process: 
“The various brain areas involved in translating perceived human movement into corresponding 
motor programs collectively act as an emulator, internally simulating the ongoing perceived 
movement… The present proposal suggests that, in tasks requiring fast action coordination, the 
emulator derives predictions about the future course of others’ actions, which could be integrated with 
the actions one is currently planning.” (pp. 468-469). 
According to this approach, action and perception are more closely linked than has 
traditionally been assumed. Specifically, for the Common Coding Theory [26], the cognitive 
representations for perceived events (perception) and intended or to-be generated events 
(action) are formed by a common representational domain: actions are coded in terms of the 
perceivable effects they should generate. For this reason, when an effect is intended, the 
movement that produces this effect as perceptual input is automatically activated, because 
actions and their effects are stored in a common representational domain. 
In simpler words, the brain has its own virtual reality system that is used in both action 
planning and action understanding. If this is true, how we can distinguish between the 
virtual action planning and the real action? The answer is easy: using presence. In his book 
“Inner Presence” Revuonso [12] clearly states:  
“To be conscious is to have the sense of presence in a world… To have contents of consciousness is to 
have patterns of phenomenological experience present… In the philosophy of presence, consciousness 
is an organized whole of transparent surrogates of virtual objects that are immediately present for us 
in the here-and-now of subjective experience.” (pp. 126-129). 
In this view, to be directly present right here or for an object to be directly present for me 
require some form of “acquaintance”: a direct awareness (intuition) based on a non 
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propositional knowledge or nonconceptual content [27]. This view is surprisingly near to 
the vision of presence as “perceptual illusion of non-mediation” [10] introduced before. In both 
cases, presence is related to a direct experience.  
However, if in the Lombard and Ditton definition the mediation is given by the used 
medium (virtual reality) in the Revuonso view [12], the mediation is given by the body: the 
experience of the body is our first virtual reality system. This vision is shared by many 
cognitive scientists. For instance Andy Clark [28] underlines that: 
“The infant, like the VR-exploring adult, must learn how to use initially unresponsive hands, arms, and 
legs to obtain its goals… With time and practice enough bodily fluency is achieved to make the wider 
world itself directly available as a kind of unmediated arena for embodied action… At such moments the 
body has become “transparent equipment”… that is not the focus of attention in use.” (p. 10). 
More, different neurological disorders clearly support this view, showing how the direct 
experience of presence in our body is the result of different and separable subcomponents 
that can be altered in some way [29]: agency, ownership and location. 
 Autopagnosia (agency): it is a neurological disease characterized by the inability to 
recognize or to orient any part of one's own body, caused by a parietal lobe lesion [30]: a 
patient with Autopagnosia is not present in his/her body; 
 Anarchic Hand (ownership): it is a neurological disease in which patients are aware of the 
actions of their anarchic hand but do not attribute its intentional behavior to themselves 
(it is not “owned” by them) (Della Sala 2006): the anarchic hand is not present to the 
patient who owns it; 
 Hemispatial Neglect (location): it is a neurological disease characterized by a deficit in 
attention to and awareness of one side of space. For example, a stroke affecting the right 
parietal lobe of the brain can lead to neglect for the left side of the visual field, causing a 
patient with neglect to behave as if the left side of sensory space is nonexistent: a patient 
with left neglect will not be present in the left part of a room.  
Recently, different authors showed that is possible to induce an illusory perception of a fake 
limb [31] as part of our own body, by altering the normal association between touch and its 
visual correlate. It is even possible to generate a body transfer illusion [31]: Slater and 
colleagues substituted the experience of male subjects' own bodies with a life-sized virtual 
human female body. This was demonstrated subjectively by questionnaire and physiologically 
through heart-rate deceleration in response to a threat to the virtual body [31].  
5. The third feature of presence: we use it to monitor our actions 
As we have seen before, Lombard and Ditton defined presence as the “perceptual illusion of 
non-mediation” [10] linking it to the experience of a medium: 
“An illusion of nonmediation occurs when a person fails to perceive or acknowledge the existence of a 
medium in his/her communication environment and responds as he/she would if the medium were not 
there. ... Presence in this view cannot occur unless a person is using a medium.” 
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However, in the previous paragraph we suggested that the outcome of many recent 
neurological studies considers the body as the first medium, through which we articulate 
ourselves and engage with others. More, recent studies on peripersonal space demonstrated 
that tool-mediated actions modify the multisensory coding of near peripersonal space [32]: 
the active use of a tool for physically and effectively interact with objects in the distant space 
appears to produce a spatial extension of the multisensory peri-hand space corresponding to 
the whole length of the tool. In other words, through the successful enaction of the subject’s 
intentions using the tool, he/she becomes physically present in the tool [33].  
These studies confirm that the subject locates himself/herself in an external space according 
to the action he/she can do in it. As suggested by Zahoric and Jenison [19]: ‘‘presence is 
tantamount to successfully supported action in the environment’’ (p. 87, italics in the original). In 
sum, the subject is “present” in a space if he/she can act in it. More, the subject is “present” in 
the space – real or virtual – where he/she can act in. Interestingly, what we need for 
presence are both the affordance for action (the possibility of acting) and its enaction (the 
possibility of successfully acting). 
The first suggestion this framework offers to the developers of virtual worlds, is that for 
presence action is more important than perception [34]: I’m more present in a perceptually 
poor virtual environment (e.g. a textual MUD) where I can act in many different ways than 
in a real-like virtual environment where I cannot do anything. 
Another consequence of this framework is the need to understand more what “acting 
successfully” means. We can start from the definition of “Agency”: “the power to alter at 
will one’s perceptual inputs” [35]. But how can we define our will? A simple answer to this 
question is: through intentions. Following this line of reasoning Presence can be defined as “the 
non mediated (prereflexive) perception of using the body to successfully transforming intentions in 
action (enaction)”  
A possible criticism to this definition is the following: “I may be asked to repair a computer, 
and I may be unable to fix it. This does not mean that I am not present in the environment 
(real or virtual) where the computer and I are.” This objection makes sense if we use the  
folk psychology definition of intention: the intention of an agent performing an action is 
his/her specific purpose in doing so. However, the latest cognitive studies clearly show that 
any behavior is the result of a complex intentional chain that cannot be analyzed at a single 
level [36].  
According to the Dynamic Theory of Intentions presented by Pacherie [36; 37] and to the 
Activity Theory introduced by Leont’ev and disseminated by Kaptelinin, & Nardi [38], 
repairing a computer is driven by an above objective (e.g., obtaining the money for paying a 
new car) and is the result of lower-level operations (e.g., removing the hard disk or the CPU, 
cleaning them, etc.) each driven by specific purposes. So, for an intention that failed 
(repairing the computer) many others were successful (removing the hard disk, cleaning it, 
etc.) inducing Presence [33; 39]. 
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Specifically, the Dynamic Theory of Intentions identifies three different “levels” or “forms” of 
intentions (Figure 2), characterized by different roles and contents: distal intentions (D-
intentions), proximal intentions (P-intentions) and motor intentions (M-intentions): 
 D-intentions (Future-directed intentions). These high-level intentions act both as intra- and 
interpersonal coordinators, and as prompters of practical reasoning about means and 
plans: in the activity “obtaining a Ph.D. in psychology” described in Figure 2, “helping 
others to solve problems” is a D-intention, the object that drives the activity of the 
subject.  
 P-intentions (Present-directed intentions). These intentions are responsible for high-level 
(conscious) forms of guidance and monitoring. They have to ensure that the imagined 
actions become current through situational control of their unfolding: in the activity 
described in Figure 1, “preparing the dissertation” is a P-intention.  
 M-intentions (Motor intentions). These intentions are responsible for low-level 
(unconscious and intuitive) forms of guidance and monitoring: we may not be aware of 
them and have only partial access to their content. Further, their contents are not 
propositional: in the activity described in Figure 2, the motor representations required 
to write using the keyboard are M-intentions.  
Any intentional level has its own role: the rational (D-intentions), situational (P-Intention) 
and motor (M-Intention) guidance and control of action. They form an intentional cascade 
[36; 37] in which higher intentions generate lower intentions. In this view the ability to feel 
“present” in a virtual reality system – a medium - basically does not differ from the ability to 
feel “present” in our body. When the subject is present during agency – he/she is able to 
successfully enact his/her intentions – he/she locates him/herself in the physical and cultural 




Figure 1. Intentional levels 
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Figure 2. The intentional chain 
More, it also suggest that even in the real world the feeling of presence will be different 
according to the ability of the subject to enact his/her intentions within an external 
environment. For instance, I’m in a restaurant for a formal dinner with some colleagues in a 
Korean restaurant, but I don’t know how to use the chopsticks I have nearby my dish. In 
this situation I’m physically there, but the lack of knowledge puts me outside, at least 
partially, from the social and cultural space of the “formal Korean dinner”. The result is a 
reduced presence and a limitation in my agency: I’m not able to enact my intention (pick up 
some rice) using the chopsticks, so I don’t use them to avoid mistakes.  
Finally, in this view presence can be described as a sophisticated but unconscious form of 
monitoring of action and experience: the self perceives the variations in the feeling of 
presence and tunes its activity accordingly. From a computational viewpoint, the experience 
of Presence is achieved through a forward-inverse model [40] (Figure 3):  
 First, the agent produces the motor command for achieving a desired state given the 
current state of the system and the current state of the environment; 
 Second, an efference copy of the motor command is fed to a forward dynamic model 
that generates a prediction of the consequences of performing this motor command; 
 Third, the predicted state is compared with the actual sensory feedback. Errors derived 
from the difference between the desired state and the actual state can be used to update 
the model and improve performance.  
The results of the comparison between the sensory prediction and the sensory consequences 
of the act (an intuitive process occurring at a sub-personal level) can then be utilized to 
determine both the agent of the action and to track any possible variation in its course. If no 
variations are perceived, the self is able to concentrate on the action and not on its 
monitoring. As suggested by the simulation theorists [41], the brain instantiates a 
sophisticated simulation, based on motor codes, of the outcome of an action and uses this to 
evaluate its course. 
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Figure 3. The feeling of presence 
For this reason, the feeling of presence − the prereflexive perception that the agent’s intentions are 
successfully enacted − is not separated by the experience of the subject but is directly related to 
it. It corresponds to what Heidegger [42] defined as “the interrupted moment of our 
habitual standard, comfortable being-in-the-world”. A higher feeling of presence is 
experienced by the self as a better quality of action and experience [19]. In fact, the subject 
perceives consciously only significant variations in the feeling of presence: breakdowns and 
optimal experiences [43]. We will discuss more in detail this point in Paragraph 10. 
6. The fourth feature of presence: it is divided in three layers 
Even if presence is a unitary feeling, on the process side it can be divided into three different 
layers/subprocesses [44; 45], phylogenetically different, that correspond reasonably well (see 
Figure 4) to the three levels of intentions identified by Pacherie in her Dynamic Theory of 
Intentions [36]: 
- Proto Presence (Self vs. non Self – M-Intentions); 
- Core Presence (Self vs. present external world – P-Intentions); 
- Extended Presence (Self vs. possible/future external world – D-Intentions). 
We define “Proto Presence” as the process of internal/external separation related to the level of 
perception-action coupling (Self vs. non-Self). The more the organism is able correctly to couple 
perceptions and movements, the more it differentiates itself from the external world, thus 
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increasing its probability of surviving. Proto presence is based on proprioception and other 
ways of knowing bodily orientation in the world. In a virtual world this is sometimes 
known as "spatial presence" and requires the tracking of body parts and appropriate and 
rapid updating of displays, for example in response to head movements. Proto Presence 
allows the enaction of M-Intentions only. 
 
Figure 4. The layers of presence 
“Core Presence” can be described as the activity of selective attention made by the Self on 
perceptions (Self vs. present external world): the more the organism is able to focus on its 
sensorial experience by leaving in the background the remaining neural processes, the more 
it is able to identify events of the present moment and the direct affordances offered by the 
current external world, increasing its probability of surviving. Core Presence allows the 
enaction of M-Intentions and P-Intentions only. Core presence in media is based largely on 
vividness of perceptible displays. This is equivalent to "sensory presence" and requires good 
quality, preferably stereographic, graphics and other displays. 
The role of “Extended Presence” is to verify the relevance to the Self of possible/future events in 
the external world (Self vs. possible/future external world). The more the Self is able to forecast 
possible/future experiences, the more it will be able to identify relevant ones, increasing the 
possibility of surviving. Extended presence allows the enaction of M-Intentions, P-Intentions 
and D-Intentions. Following Sperber and Wilson’s approach [46], an input is relevant when 
its processing yields a positive cognitive effect, a worthwhile difference to the Self’s 
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representation of the world. Extended Presence requires intellectually and/or emotionally 
significant content. So, reality judgment influences the level of extended presence - a real 
event is more relevant than a fictitious one.  
As underlined by Dillon and colleagues [47], converging lines of evidence from different 
perspectives and methodologies support this three-layered view of Presence. In their 
analysis they identify three dimensions common to all the different perspectives, relating to 
a "spatial" dimension (M-intentions), a dimension relating to how consistent the media 
experience is with the real world, "naturalness" (P-intentions), and an "engagement" 
dimension (D-intentions). This view has two main consequences [11; 33].  
On one side, the role of the different layers will be related to the complexity of the activity: 
the more complex is the activity, the more layers will be needed to produce a high level of 
Presence (Figure 4). At the lower level – motor intention (e.g., grasping a ball) – proto 
Presence is enough to induce a satisfying feeling of Presence. At the higher level – distal 
intention (e.g., improving stress management) – the media experience has to support all 
three layers (e.g., allowing movement, proto presence; allowing interaction with the 
environment, core presence; giving a sense to the experience, extended presence).  
On the other side, subjects with different intentions will not experience the same level of 
Presence, even when immersed in the same virtual environment [13]: this means that 
understanding and supporting the intentions of the user will improve his/her Presence in a 
virtual world. More, maximal Presence is achieved when the environment is able to support 
the full intentional chain of the user. 
7. Presence and clinical change 
The use of virtual reality (VR) in clinical psychology has become more widespread [48]. The 
key characteristics of virtual environments for most clinical applications are the high level of 
control of the interaction with the tool, and the enriched experience provided to the patient 
[2]. Typically, in VR the patient learns to cope with problematic situations related to his/her 
problem. For this reason, the most common application of VR in this area is the treatment of 
anxiety disorders, i.e., fear of heights, fear of flying, and fear of public speaking [49; 50]. 
Indeed, VR exposure therapy (VRE) has been proposed as a new medium for exposure 
therapy [48] that is safer, less embarrassing, and less costly than reproducing the real world 
situations. The rationale is simple: in VR the patient is intentionally confronted with the 
feared stimuli while allowing the anxiety to attenuate. Avoiding a dreaded situation 
reinforces a phobia, and each successive exposure to it reduces the anxiety through the 
processes of habituation and extinction.  
However, it seems likely that VR can be more than a tool to provide exposure and 
desensitisation [48]. As noted by Glantz and colleagues [51]: "VR technology may create 
enough capabilities to profoundly influence the shape of therapy." (p.92). Emerging applications of 
VR in psychotherapy include eating disorders and obesity (see Figure 5) [52-54], 
posttraumatic stress disorder [55], addictions [56], sexual disorders [57], and pain 
management [58]. But what is the potential role of presence in these treatments? 
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Figure 5. The use of VR in the treatment of Obesity: A phase of the therapy (left) and a screen-shot of 
the virtual environment (right) 
To answer this question let’s start from another question: How is it possible to achieve the 
desired change in a patient? This question has many possible answers according to the 
specific psychotherapeutic approach; however, in general, change occurs through an intense 
focus on a particular instance or experience [59]. By exploring this experience as thoroughly 
as possible, the patient can relive all of the significant elements associated with it (i.e., 
conceptual, emotional, motivational, and behavioral) and make them available for 
reorganization. Within this general model there exist many specific methods, including the 
insight-based approach of psychoanalysis, the schema-reorganization goals of cognitive 
therapy, the functional analysis of behavioral activation, the interpersonal relationship focus 
of interpersonal therapy, and the enhancement of experience awareness in experiential 
therapies.  
What are the differences between them? According to Safran and Greenberg [60], behind the 
specific therapeutic approach there are two different models of change: bottom-up and top-
down. Bottom-up processing begins with a specific emotional experience and leads 
eventually to change at the behavioral and conceptual level; top-down change usually 
involves exploring and challenging tacit rules and beliefs that guide the processing of 
emotional experience and behavioral planning. These two models of change are focused on 
the two different cognitive systems – intuition and reasoning – we discussed in Paragraph 4 
Even if many therapeutic approaches are based on just one of the two change models, a 
therapist usually requires both [59]. Some patients seem to operate primarily by means of 
top-down information processing, which may then lead the way to corrective emotional 
experiences. For others, the appropriate access point is the intensification of their emotional 
experience and their awareness of both it and its related behaviors. Finally, different 
patients who initially engage the therapeutic work through top-down processing only may 
be able to make use of bottom-up emotional processing later in the therapy.  
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In this situation, the sense of presence provided by advanced technologies, VR in particular, 
offers a critical advantage [61]: used appropriately, it is possible to target a specific cognitive 
system without any significant change in the therapeutic approach. For instance, behavioral 
therapists may use a virtual environment for activating the fear structure in a phobic patient 
through confrontation with the feared stimuli; a cognitive therapist may use VR situations to 
assess situational memories or disrupt habitual patterns of selective attention; experiential 
therapists may use VR to isolate the patient from the external world and help him/her in 
practicing the right actions; psychodynamic therapists may use VEs as complex symbolic 
systems for evoking and releasing effects. 
In fact, VR can be described as an advanced imaginal system: an experiential form of imagery 
that is as effective as reality in inducing emotional responses [62]. As underlined by Baños, 
Botella & Perpiña [63], the VR experience can help the course of therapy for “its capability of 
reducing the distinction between the computer’s reality and the conventional reality.” In 
fact, “VR can be used for experiencing different identities and… even other forms of self, as 
well” (p. 289). The possibility of structuring a large amount of realistic or imaginary 
controlled stimuli and, simultaneously, of monitoring the possible responses generated by 
the user of the technology offers a considerable increase in the likelihood of therapeutic 
effectiveness, as compared to traditional procedures [64].  
More, As noted by Glantz and colleagues [51]:  
“One reason it is so difficult to get people to update their assumptions is that change often requires a 
prior step – recognizing the distinction between an assumption and a perception. Until revealed to be 
fallacious, assumptions constitute the world; they seem like perceptions, and as long as they do, they 
are resistant to change.” (p. 96).  
Using the sense of presence induced by VR, it is easier for the therapist to develop realistic 
experiences demonstrating to the patient that what looks like a perception – e.g., the body 
image distortion – in fact is a result of his/her mind. Once this has been understood, 
individual maladaptive assumptions can then be challenged more easily. 
However, as noted by Price and Anderson [65] presence is not enough to produce a clinical 
change. The two authors explored the relation between presence, anxiety, and treatment 
outcome in a clinical study that used a virtual airplane to treat individuals with fear of flying. 
The results support presence as a conduit that enabled phobic anxiety to be expressed during 
exposure to a virtual environment. Nevertheless, presence was not supported as contributing 
to treatment outcome: feeling present during exposure may be necessary but not sufficient to 
achieve benefit from VR therapy. These results echoed findings from Krinj and colleagues [66], 
who compared the efficacy of a highly immersive CAVE-like system and the less immersive 
but more affordable HMD technology. They reported more presence and more anxiety in the 
CAVE system, but no difference in treatment outcome.  
To better understand the possible link between presence and clinical change in the next two 
paragraphs we will explore the connections between presence, emotions, optimal 
experiences and therapy. 
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8. Presence for clinical change: The role of emotions 
One of the most important effects of presence for clinical practice is that a virtual experience 
may evoke the same reactions and emotions as a real experience. For instance, Slater and 
colleagues [67] used VR to reproduce the Stanley Milgram's 1960s experimental approach: 
the participants were invited to administer a series of word association memory tests to a 
female virtual human  (avatar) representing the stranger; when the avatar gave an incorrect 
answer, the participants were instructed to administer an “electric shock” to her, increasing 
the voltage each time; the avatar then responded with increasing discomfort and protests, 
eventually demanding termination of the experiment.  
Their results show that in spite of the fact that all participants knew for sure that neither the 
avatar nor the shocks were real, the participants who saw and heard the female virtual 
human tended to respond to the situation at the subjective, behavioral and physiological 
levels as if it was real. As noted by the researchers [67]: 
“In the debriefing interviews many said that they were surprised by their own responses, and all said 
that it had produced negative feelings – for some this was a direct feeling, in others it was mediated 
through a ‘what if it were real?’ feeling. Others said that they continually had to reassure themselves 
that nothing was really happening, and it was only on that basis that they could continue giving the 
shocks.” 
Experimental manipulations of emotions and presence have been conducted. Bouchard and 
colleagues [68] immersed adults suffering from snake phobia to a virtual environment where 
anxiety was experimentally induced, or not, by manipulating the apprehension of the 
participants and keeping the content of the immersions identical. Using a single-item measure 
of presence, the results showed that presence was significantly higher when participants were 
anxious during the immersion than in the baseline or the non-anxious immersion.  
Baños, Botella, Guerrero, Liaño. Alcañiz, & Rey [69] compared the sense of presence 
between virtual and imaginary environments. Participants were randomly assigned to one 
of the two conditions (imagined versus virtual spaces) and the subjective sense of presence 
was measured in three moments (beginning, middle, and end). Results shown that the 
participants in “imagery” spaces indicated a decrease of their sense of presence, whereas the 
opposite occurs in participants in “virtual” spaces.  
Michaud et al. [70] experimentally manipulated presence in a sample of heights phobics 
who had to take an elevator and perform tasks on a scaffold outside of a 15-story building. 
When the immersion in the virtual environment was conducted in a high-presence setting, 
the level of anxiety was significantly higher than when the immersion was conducted in a 
low-presence setting.  
Riva and colleagues [71] also analyzed the possible use of VR as an affective medium 
focusing on the relationship between presence and emotions. Their data showed a circular 
interaction between presence and emotions: on one side, the feeling of presence was greater 
in the "emotional" environments; on the other side, the emotional state was influenced by 
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the level of presence. Taken together these results, in agreement with the model presented 
before, underline the existence of a bi-directional relationship between presence and 
emotions. 
First, the higher the presence, the higher intensity of emotions the user experiences. 
Therefore, if the focus is on designing applications capable of eliciting emotions with  
the goal of reducing or modifying them (as in psychological therapy), the environments 
must be able to induce a high feeling of presence through a full support to the intentions of 
the user.  
However, the opposite could also be claimed: the higher the intensity of the emotions and 
feelings, the higher the presence and reality judgment. From this point of view, the focus for 
psychological treatment would lie on designing relevant environments, providing 
intellectually and/or emotionally significant content for the specific sample involved in the 
treatment. For instance, a recent study by Gorini and colleagues [72] comparing a sample of 
20 Mexican participants - 8 living in El Tepeyac, a small rural and isolated Mexican village 
characterized by a very primitive culture, and 12 high civilized inhabitants of Mexico City - 
clearly showed that VR exposure to a relaxing environment has different physiological and 
psychological effects according to the cultural and technological background of the users.  
A study by Bouchard et al. [73] studied presence using a virtual environment designed to 
treat specific phobias (musophobia) with VR. Participants in both conditions were immersed 
in the same VE containing a rodent, yet in one condition they were deceived and led to 
believe that they were actually being immersed in real time in the physical room with the 
rodent. The deception used a blend of mixed videoconference-VR technologies, display of 
high-tech hardware relaying the videoconference and the VR computers, and false 
instructions stating that they were “currently live in the real room” or that they were 
“seeing a fake 3D copy of a room”. Presence was significantly higher when participants 
were told they were seeing the “real” room that was being projected in the head-mounted 
display in real time [73]. This study confirms the possibility of manipulating presence 
without changing any objective properties of the VE. 
9. Presence for clinical change: The role of optimal experiences 
In Paragraph 6 we discussed a critical feature of presence: it provides the self with a feedback 
about the status of its activity. Specifically, the self perceives the variations in the feeling of 
presence (breakdowns and optimal experience) and tunes its activity accordingly [43].  
Winograd and Flores [74] refer to presence disruptions as breakdowns: a breakdown occurs 
when, during our activity, an aspect of our environment that we usually take for granted 
becomes part of our consciousness. If this happens, we shift our attention from action to the 
object or environment to cope with it. To illustrate, imagine sitting outdoors engrossed  
in reading a book on a pleasant evening. As the sun sets and the light diminishes one 
continues reading, engrossed in the story until one becomes aware that the light is no longer 
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suitable for reading. In such conditions, before any overt change in behavior, what we 
experience is a breakdown in reading and a shift of attention from the book to the light 
illuminating the book.  
It is interesting to consider why we experience these breakdowns. Our hypothesis is that 
breakdowns are a sophisticated evolutionary tool used to control the quality of experience 
that ultimately enhances our chances of survival [13; 44]. As a breakdown occurs we 
experience a lower level of presence. This reduces the quality of experience, and leads us to 
confront environmental difficulties through an attentive shift. 
On the other side we have optimal experiences. According to Csikszentmihalyi [75], 
individuals preferentially engage in opportunities for action associated with a positive, 
complex and rewarding state of consciousness, defined as “optimal experience”, or “flow.” 
There are some exceptional situations in real life in which the activity of the subject is 
characterized by a higher level of presence. In these situations the subject experiences a full 
sense of control and immersion. When this experience is associated to a positive emotional 
state, it can create a flow state.  
An example of flow is the case where a professional athlete is playing exceptionally well 
(positive emotion) and achieves a state of mind where nothing else matters but the game 
(high level of presence). For Ghani and Deshpande [76] the two main characteristics of flow 
are (a) the total concentration in an activity and (b) the enjoyment which one derives from 
the activity. Moreover, these authors identified two other factors affecting the experience of 
flow: a sense of control over one's environment and the level of challenge relative to a 
certain skill level. 
Following this vision, it is possible to design mediated situations that elicit optimal 
experiences by activating a high level of presence [77]. Optimal experiences promote 
individual development. As underlined by Massimini and Delle Fave, [78]: 
“To replicate it, a person will search for increasingly complex challenges in the associated activities 
and will improve his or her skill, accordingly. This process has been defined as cultivation; it fosters 
the growth of complexity not only in the performance of flow activities but in individual behavior as a 
whole.” (p. 28).  
According to this vision, existing VR treatments should include positive peak experiences 
because they serve as triggers for a broader process of motivation and empowerment. 
Within this context, the transformation of flow can be defined as a person's ability to draw 
upon an optimal experience and use it to marshal new and unexpected psychological 
resources and sources of involvement. We hypothesize that it is possible to use VR to 
activate a transformation of flow to be used for clinical purposes [77]. The proposed 
approach is the following: first, identify an enriched environment that contains functional 
real-world demands; second, using the technology to enhance the level of presence of the 
subject in the environment and to induce an optimal experience; third, allowing cultivation, 
by linking this optimal experience to the actual experience of the subject.  
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To verify the link between advanced technologies and optimal experiences, the “V-
STORE Project” investigated the quality of experience and the feeling of presence in a 
group of 10 patients with Frontal Lobe Syndrome involved in VR-based cognitive 
rehabilitation [79].  
On one side, the project used the Experience Sampling Method for repeated on-line 
assessments of the external situation and the emotional, cognitive and motivational 
components of daily experience during one-week of these patients, including traditional 
cognitive rehabilitation and sessions of exposure to V-STORE VR environment.  
On the other side, after the VR experience they used the ITC-Sense of Presence Inventory to 
evaluate the feeling of presence induced by the VR sessions. Findings highlighted the 
association of VR sessions with both positive affect and a high level of presence. In 
particular, during the VR sessions, the “spatial presence,” the first scale of the ITC-Sense of 
Presence Inventory, was significantly correlated with the positive psychological feelings of 
“being free” (r = 0.81, p < 0.01) and “being relaxed” (r = 0.67, p < 0.05). 
The transformation of flow may also exploit the plasticity of the brain producing some form 
of functional reorganization [80]. Recent experimental results from the work of Hunter 
Hoffman and his group in the treatment of chronic pain [81] also might be considered to 
foster this vision. Few experiences are more intense than the pain associated with severe 
burn injuries. In particular, daily wound care - the cleaning and removal of dead tissue to 
prevent infection - can be so painful that even the aggressive use of opioids (morphine-
related analgesics) cannot control the pain.  
However it is well known that distraction - for example, by having the patient listen to 
music - can help to reduce pain for some people. Hoffman and colleagues conducted a 
controlled study of the efficacy of VR as an advanced distraction by comparing it with a 
popular Nintendo video game. The results showed dramatic reductions in pain ratings 
during VR compared to the video game [82]. 
Further, using a functional magnetic resonance imaging scanner they measured pain-related 
brain activity for each participant during conditions of virtual reality and without virtual 
reality in an order randomized study [81]. The team studied five regions of the brain that are 
known to be associated with pain processing, the anterior cingulate cortex, primary and 
secondary somatosensory cortex, insula, and thalamus. They found that during VR the 
activity in all the regions showed significant reductions. In particular, they found direct 
modulation of pain responses within the brain during VR distraction. The degree of 
reduction in pain-related brain activity ranged from 50 percent to 97 percent. 
10. Presence for clinical change: The neuroVR software 
Although it is undisputable tha potential of VR – as presence inducing technology - for 
clinical and research applications, the majority of existing clinical virtual environments are 
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still in the laboratory or investigation stage. In a review, Riva [48] identified four major 
issues that limit the use of VR in clinical practive:  
 the lack of standardization in VR hardware and software, and the limited possibility of 
tailoring the virtual environments (VEs) to the specific requirements of the clinical or 
the experimental setting;   
 the low availability of standardized protocols that can be shared by the community of 
researchers;  
 the high costs (up to 200,000 US$) required for designing and testing a clinical VR 
application;  
 most VEs in use today are not user-friendly; expensive technical support or continual 
maintenance are often required.  
To help researchers to overcome these issues and to develop VR applications able to exploit 
the clinical potential of presence, Riva and colleagues presented at the Medicine Meets 
Virtual Reality conference in 2007 a free virtual reality platform based on open-source 
software [83]: NeuroVR (http://www.neurovr.org). This software allows non-expert users to 
adapt the content of different pre-designed virtual environments to the specific needs of the 
clinical or experimental setting. Following the feedbacks of the thousands of users who 
downloaded the first version, they developed in late 2011 a new version – NeuroVR 2 – that 
improves the possibility for the therapist to enhance the patient’s feeling of familiarity and 
intimacy with the virtual scene, by using external sounds, photos or videos [84]. 
In NeuroVR 2, the user can choose the appropriate psychological stimuli/stressors from a 
database of objects (both 2D and 3D) and videos, and easily place them into the virtual 
environment. The edited scene can then be visualized in the Player using either immersive 
or non-immersive displays. Currently, the NeuroVR library includes 18 different virtual 
scenes (apartment, office, square, supermarket, park, classroom, etc.), covering some of the 
most studied clinical applications of VR: specific phobias, cognitive rehabilitation, panic 
disorders and eating disorders.  
The VR suite leverages two major open-source projects in the VR field: Delta3D 
(http://www.delta3d.org) and OpenSceneGraph (http:// www.openscenegraph.org). Both 
are building components that integrates with ad-hoc code to handle the editing and the 
simulation. The NeuroVR2 Editor's GUI (see Figure 6) is now based on the QT cross-
platform application and UI framework from Nokia (http://qt.nokia.com/) that grants an 
higher level of editing and customization over the editor functionalities, while the graphical 
rendering is done using OpenSceneGraph, an open source high performance 3D graphics 
toolkit (http://www.openscenegraph.org/projects/osg).  
The new features include advanced action triggering based both on user behavior 
(proximity and collision) and on therapist choice (keyboard), realistic walk-style motion, 
advanced lighting techniques for enhanced image quality, and streaming of videos using 
alpha channel for transparency. 
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Figure 6. The NeuroVR 2 Editor 
The NeuroVR 2 Player too has been largely rewritten to grant a more efficient workflow for 
the scenes playback and has a brand new startup interface written in QT. The whole suite is 
developed in C++ language, targeted for the Microsoft Windows platform but fully portable 
to other systems if needed.  
11. Presence for clinical change: The interreality paradigm 
Even if virtual reality is a very good presence-inducing technology, there is still room for 
improvement. Apparently, the main limitation of its actual use in clinical applications is the 
distance from reality [85]: the virtual experience is a distinct realm, separate from the 
emotions and behaviors experienced by the patient in the real world, In other words, the 
behavior of the patient in VR has no direct effects on the real life experience. More, the 
emotions and problems experienced by the patient in the real world are not directly 
addressed in the VR exposure [85]. 
To address this issue recently Fidopiastis and colleagues suggested the use of mixed 
reality (MR) [86]. The use of MR in clinical psychology is not new. Cristina Botella and her 
team used it for the treatment of small animal phobias [87]. The main advantage of this 
approach is that in MR virtual object are integrated into the real world: during the therapy 
the patient is seeing a real-world scene, and a series of computer-generated objects that, at 
that same moment, are super-imposed on the real physical environment. As noted by 
Botella and colleagues [87], this approach offers other advantages, too: it facilitates the 
experience of presence (the feeling of being there), and reality judgment (the fact of 
judging the experience as real) since the environment the patient is seeing is, in fact the 
"reality”. 
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In this chapter we suggest that a further advancement might be offered by a new 
technological paradigm, Interreality: an hybrid, closed-loop empowering experience 
bridging physical and virtual worlds [88]. Specifically, the Interreality approach provides a 
twofold feedback activity: 
 behavior in the physical world influences the experience in the virtual world: 
 For example, if the emotional regulation during the day was poor, some new 
experiences in the virtual world will be unlocked to address this issue. 
 For example, if the emotional regulation was okay, the virtual experience will focus 
on a different issue. 
 behavior in the virtual world influences the experience in the real world:  
 For example, if I participate in the virtual support group I can send text messages 
during the day to the other participants. 
 For example, if my coping skills in the virtual world were poor, the decision 
support system will increase the chance of possible warnings in real life and will 
provide additional homework assignments. 
On one side, the patient is continuously assessed in the virtual and real worlds by tracking 
the behavioral and emotional status in the context of challenging tasks (customization of the 
therapy according to the characteristics of the patient). On the other side, feedback is 
continuously provided to improve both the appraisal and the coping skills of the patient 
through a conditioned association between effective performance state and task execution 
behaviors (improvement of self efficacy).  
Our claim is that bridging virtual experiences – fully controlled by the therapist, used to 
learn coping skills and emotional regulation - with real experiences – that allow both the 
identification of any critical problem and the assessment of what has been learned – using 
advanced technologies (virtual worlds, advanced sensors and PDA/mobile phones) is a 
feasible way to address the above limitations. This approach may offer the following 
innovations to current VR and/or MR protocols: 
 objective and quantitative assessment of symptoms using biosensors and behavioral analysis: 
monitoring of the patient behavior and of his general and psychological status, early 
detection of symptoms of critical evolutions and timely activation of feedback  in a 
closed-loop approach; 
 decision support for treatment planning through data fusion and detection algorithms: 
monitoring of the response of the patient to the treatment, management of the treatment  
and  support to the clinicians in their therapeutic decisions. 
 provision of warnings and motivating feedback to improve compliance and long-term outcome: 
the sense of “presence” allowed by this approach affords the opportunity to deliver 
behavioral, emotional and physiological self-regulation training in an entertaining and 
motivating fashion. 
For example, in the standard VR protocol used in the treatment of post-traumatic stress 
disorders [89] “imagination and/or exposure evoke emotions and the meaning of the associated 
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feelings can be changed through reflection and relaxation”. We would suggest as an alternative 
that “controlled experience evokes emotions that result in meaningful new feelings which can be 
reflected upon and eventually changed through reflection and relaxation”.  
More, if the typical VR exposure protocol focuses on directly modifying the content of 
dysfunctional thoughts through a rational and deliberate process, Interreality focuses on 
modifying the patient’s relationship with his or her thinking through more contextualized 
experiential processes. 
In conclusion we argue that the potential advantages offered to VR treatments by the 
Interreallity approach are: 
 a real-time feedback between physical and virtual worlds: Interreality uses bio and activity 
sensors and devices (PDAs, mobile phones, etc) both to track in real time the behavior 
and the health status of the user and to provide targeted suggestions and guidelines.  
 an extended sense of community: Interreality uses hybrid social interaction and dynamics 
of group sessions to provide each users with targeted – but also anonymous, if required 
- social support in both physical and virtual world.  
 an extended sense of presence: Interreality uses advanced simulations (virtual experiences) 
to transform health guidelines and provisions in experience. In Interreality the patients 
do not receive abstract info but live meaningful experiences. 
12. Conclusions 
As explained previously, the feeling of presence induced by VR has helped this medium to 
find a significant space in clinical treatment. In particular, VR is playing an important role as 
a presence-enhanced supportive technique. Through presence, VR helps the patient to 
confront his/her problems in a meaningful yet controlled and safe setting. Furthermore, it 
opens the possibility of experiencing his/her life in a more satisfying way. In fact, VR 
therapists are using presence to provide meaningful experiences capable of inducing deep 
and permanent change in their patients. But what is presence? And how it can be used to 
improve the process of clinical change? 
The International Society of Presence Research, defines “Presence” (a shortened version of 
the term “telepresence”) as a “psychological state in which even though part or all of an 
individual’s current experience is generated by and/or filtered through human-made 
technology, part or all of the individual’s perception fails to accurately acknowledge the role 
of the technology in the experience”. This approach describes the sense of presence as 
“Media Presence”, a function of our experience of a given medium. The main outcome of 
this approach is the “perceptual illusion of non-mediation” [10] definition of presence. 
Following it, presence is produced by means of the disappearance of the medium from the 
conscious attention of the subject.  
The main advantage of this approach is its predictive value: the level of presence is reduced 
by the experience of mediation during the action. The main limitation of this vision is what 
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is not said. What is presence for? Is it a specific cognitive process? What is its role in our 
daily experience?  
To address these questions a second group of researchers, including the authors of this 
chapter, considers presence as “Inner Presence”, the feeling of being located in a perceived 
external world around the self [11-13]. In this view presence is broad psychological 
phenomenon, not necessarily linked to the experience of a medium, whose goal is the 
control of the individual and social activity. 
In the chapter we used the following three research outcomes emerging from the recent 
work of cognitive sciences to build a cognitive theory of  presence:  
1. Cognitive processes can be either rational or intuitive: we showed that presence is an 
intuitive feeling tproduced by an experience-based metacognitive judgment; 
2. Skills become intuitive when our brain is able to simulate their outcome: we suggested that 
presence monitors intuitively our activity processes using embodied simulations; 
3. Space is perceived in terms of the actions we could take towards them: we argued that the 
feeling of presence in a real or virtual space is directly correlated to the outcome of the 
actions the subject can enact in it. 
In sum, the feeling of presence can be described as the product of an intuitive experience-
based metacognitive judgment related to the enaction of our intentions: We are present in an 
environment - real and/or synthetic - when we are able, inside it, to intuitively transform our 
intentions in actions.  
From a clinical viewpoint presence transforms VR in an “empowering environment”, a 
special, sheltered setting where patients can start to explore and act without feeling 
threatened [3]. Nothing the patient fears can “really” happen to them in VR. With such 
assurance, they can freely explore, experiment, feel, live, and experience feelings and/or 
thoughts. VR thus becomes a very useful intermediate step between the therapist’s office 
and the real world. In other words, the key feature of VR for clinical goals is that it offers an 
effective support to the activity of the subject by activating a high sense of “presence”, the 
feeling of being inside the virtual world.  
However, as noted by Price and Anderson [65] presence is not enough to produce a clinical 
change: feeling present during VR exposure is necessary but not sufficient to achieve benefit 
from VR therapy. For this reason, in the last two paragraphs we explored the links between 
presence, emotions and optimal experiences. 
First, the higher the presence, the higher is the intensity of emotions experienced by the 
user. Therefore, if the focus is on designing applications capable of eliciting emotions with 
the goal of reducing or modifying them (as in psychological therapy), the environments 
must be able to induce a high feeling of presence through a full support to the intentions of 
the user. However, the opposite could also be claimed: the higher the intensity of the 
emotions and feelings, the higher the presence and reality judgment. From this point of 
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view, the focus for psychological treatment would lie on designing relevant environments, 
providing intellectually and/or emotionally significant content for the specific sample 
involved in the treatment. 
Second, the higher the presence, the optimal is the experience for the user. Following this 
vision, it is possible to design mediated situations that elicit optimal experiences by 
activating a high level of presence. More, given the link between optimal experiences and 
individual development, VR treatments should promote positive peak experiences 
because they serve as triggers for a broader process of motivation and empowerment. The 
proposed approach is the following: first, develop a VR environment that contains 
functional real-world demands; second, use the technology to enhance the level of 
presence of the subject in the environment and to induce an optimal experience; third, 
allow cultivation, by linking this optimal experience to the actual experience of the 
subject. 
To help therapists and researchers to test these ideas we provided two further suggestions.  
On one side we introduced NeuroVR (http://www.neurovr.org). This software, that reached 
version 2, allows non-expert users to adapt the content different pre-designed virtual 
environments to the specific needs of the clinical or experimental setting. Using the software 
the user can choose the appropriate psychological stimuli/stressors from a database of 
objects (both 2D and 3D) and videos, and easily place them into the virtual environment. 
The edited scene can then be visualized in the Player using either immersive or non-
immersive displays. Currently, the NeuroVR library includes 18 different virtual scenes 
(apartment, office, square, supermarket, park, classroom, etc.), covering some of the most 
studied clinical applications of VR: specific phobias, cognitive rehabilitation, panic disorders 
and eating disorders.  
On the other side, even if virtual reality is a very good presence-inducing technology, there 
is still room for improvement. Apparently, the main limitation of its actual use in clinical 
applications is the distance from reality: the virtual experience is a distinct realm, separate 
from the emotions and behaviors experienced by the patient in the real world, In other 
words, the behavior of the patient in VR has no direct effects on the real life experience. 
More, the emotions and problems experienced by the patient in the real world are not 
directly addressed in the VR exposure. To overcome the above limitations, here we 
suggested a new paradigm for e-health – “Interreality” – that integrates assessment and 
treatment within a hybrid environment, bridging physical and virtual world.  
The clinical use of Interreality is based on a closed-loop concept that involves the use of 
technology for assessing, adjusting and/or modulating the emotional regulation of the 
patient, his/her coping skills and appraisal of the environment (both virtual, under the 
control of a clinicians, and real, facing actual stimuli) based upon a comparison of that 
patient’s behavioural and physiological responses with a training or performance criterion: 
 the assessment  is conducted continuously throughout the virtual and real experiences; 
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 the information is constantly used to improve both the emotional management and the 
coping skills of the patient. 
In conclusion, we suggest that the feeling of presence, here described as an intuitive 
metacognitive judgment related to the enaction of our intentions - we are present in a real or 
virtual environment we are able, inside it, to intuitively transform our intentions in actions – 
is potentially very useful for improving the clinical practice. Our hope is that the present 
chapter and the ideas presented in it will stimulate a discussion within the clinical and 
research VR community about the potential, the advantages and the possible limitations that 
the use of presence inducing technologies – such as virtual reality, mixed reality and 
Interreality – may offer to clinical change. 
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